When Responsive Legislation Ignores the Forest for the Trees by Curtis, Matthew G.
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Law Student Publications School of Law
Summer 2011




Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/law-student-publications
Part of the Environmental Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Student Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Matthew G. Curtis, When Responsive Legislation Ignores the Forest for the Trees, 10 Rich. J. Global L. & Bus. 387 (2011).
WHEN RESPONSIVE LEGISLATION IGNORES THE
FOREST FOR THE TREES
Matthew G. Curtis'
I. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES IN LEGISLATION THAT
HASTEN A RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO
Large-scale financial disasters have resulted in equally large-
scale overhauls of the system responsible for financial industry regula-
tion.2 Choice over responding parties to these disasters is minimal,
and the public inevitably looks to the government for assistance and
explanation.' The increasingly globalized economy causes any nation-
wide financial regulation in the U.S. to be felt throughout interna-
tional markets.' U.S. environmental regulation, while not felt imme-
diately abroad, can have drastic impacts on business planning,
environmental risk-management, and human rights in the developing
world.'
Quick-fix responses by Congress-applying band-aid solutions
to what really are deep-rooted problems-may overlook opportunities
1 2012 J.D. Candidate, University of Richmond School of Law. This article is the
winning entry of the 2011 Daniel T. Murphy International Law Writing
Competition.
2 See Federal Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §77a (2006) (requiring companies to pub-
licly disclose material information about securities); The Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2006) (creating the SEC, the principal federal agency
responsible for securities and market oversight); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub
L. 107-204, 1116 Stat. 745 (hereinafter "SOX"); the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Re-
form and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, (H.R. 4173) (July 21, 2010)
[hereinafter Dodd-Frank] (resulting out of Great Depression, Enron/Worldcom,
and Subprime Mortgage crises, respectively).
3 See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, ,
at 291 (2011) [hereinafter FCIC report].
4 Cf Douglas Kysar, Symposium of Waterbanks, Piggybanks, and Bankruptcy:
Changing Directions in Water Law: IV. Market Misgivings: The Role of Private
Global Governance, 83 TEX. L.REV. . 2109, at 2112 (2005).
5 See David Konisky, Regulatory Competition and Environmental Enforcement: Is
There a Race to the Bottom?, 51 AM. J. POL. ScI. 853, at 854 ( 2007) (discussing
reasons and repercussions that state regulatory behavior is interdependent with
other states). Cf. The 2011 Oil Shock: More of a Threat to the World Economy
than Investors Seem to Think, EcONOMIST, Mar. 3, 2001, available at http://www.
economist.com/node/18281774 (noting "America's economy is needlessly vulnera-
ble" to unrest in the Middle East and North Africa thanks to its addiction to and
light taxation of oil).
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to implement legislation to address the systematic causes of such di-
sasters.' This paper will compare the broad principles of the most re-
cent financial responsive legislation to patterns present in U.S.
environmental regulation. Financial and environmental regulation
share similar root causes, which often arise through policy gaps re-
vealed in the regulatory schemes.' A major flaw contributing to the
creation and exploitation of gaps in both areas of enforcement is the
failure to look beyond traditional accounting practices and measures.'
This begins with an erroneous view that our macroeconomic system is
separate or superior to the ecological system we occupy and inhibits
progressive responses in both areas of regulation.9  The
macroeconomy:
is an open subsystem of the ecosystem and is totally
dependent upon it, both as a source for inputs of low-
entropy matter-energy and as a sink for outputs of
high-entropy matter-energy. Given such a conception,
an inescapable question arises regarding how much the
economic subsystem can grow before it places an
unsustainable burden on the natural ecosystem.
Conventional economists fail to address this issue be-
cause the macroeconomy is conceived of as the super-
structure-conceptually; nothing exists "around" the
macroeconomy. 10
Increased penalization through top-down sanctions, in an at-
tempt to bring companies into compliance, has repeatedly failed in
6 See FCIC report, supra note 3, at ch. 16.
7 Politicians frequently inform citizens of the various policy gaps in the aftermath
of such disasters. See, e.g., Alan Kovski, Salazar Agrees With Rahall On Mandat-
ing New Regulatory Offices for Offshore Drilling, [July] Daily Envtl. Rep. (BNA)
No. 125, at A-9, (July 1, 2010). ("Industry does not have the ability to deal with
this kind of blowout scenario."); Obama Calls For Update To Oil Pollution Laws
After Meeting With Congressional Leaders, [June] Daily Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No.
111, at A-11, (June 11, 2010) ("The Oil Pollution Act was in 1990, and it didn't
foresee deepwater drilling.").
8 These practices fail to account for sources of discounting, exploitation, and mar-
ket-manipulation. See, e.g., Herman Daly, A Marxian-Malthusian View of Poverty
and Development, 25 PoPuLATIoN STUD.,25, 28 (1971) ("the word exploitation has
been virtually banished from polite economics. "); Douglas Kysar, Discount-
ing. .on Stilts 74 U. CHI. L. Rnv. 119 (2007).
9 See Konisky, supra note 5.
10 Douglas Kysar, Sustainability, Distribution and the Macroeconomic Analysis of
Law, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1, at 22 (2001).
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many different enforcement contexts.' Legislation often yields unin-
tended consequences, especially when the relationships between jus-
tice, freedom, and responsibility are ignored, and opportunities to
create incentives promoting sustainable economic growth and sound
environmental policy are trivialized or ignored entirely. " The most
effective form of government regulation uses transparency and public
accountability assurance as a means of control."'
The most recent large-scale legislative responses to economic
crises have primarily aimed to ensure accounting transparency and
heightened protections for consumers and investors.' The contents of
these two bills are part of a broad pattern in federal legislation that
attempts to account for unintended consequences of the legislation and
the incentives they create for economic exploitation.s The incentives
created by US environmental and economic regulatory activity have a
global impact, particularly through business planning incentives to
avoid domestic regulations by outsourcing or leaving the country alto-
gether." The unintended consequences of domestic job loss, corporate
11 See Ethan A. Nadelmann, Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms
in International Society, 44 INT. ORG., 479-526 (1990); Jose Antonio Marina,
Genealogy of Morality and Law, 3 ETHICAL THEORY AND MORAL PRACTICE (2000).
12 AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 3(Random House, 1999, First ed.
1996)(discussing the role of freedom as both the ends and means of economic de-
velopment in economically depressed, natural resource-rich nation-states)( In his
introduction, Sen makes the essential argument that ties the root causes of finan-
cial and environmental sustainability in the developing world.).
13 Id., at xiii. "In line with the importance I attach to the role of public discussion
as a vehicle of social change and economic progress. .this work is presented for
open deliberation and critical scrutiny."
14 See SOX and Dodd-Frank, supra note 2. See also infra notes 19 and 20(develop-
ing the connection between lack of political freedom and developing world's perpet-
ual economic distress.).
15 See David S. Huntington, Summary of Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Legisla-
tion, THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REFORM,
available at http://blogs.law.harvard.edulcorpgov/2010/07/07/summary-of-dodd-
frank-financial-regulation-legislation/ (discussing Dodd-Frank attempts through
these pieces of legislation to assure transparency and protection); Lisa McCauley
Parles & Susan A. O'Sullivan, et al., Sarbanes-Oxley: An Overview of Current Is-
sues and Concerns, REVIEW OF BUSINESS (Spring-Summer 2007), available at
http://www.entrepreneur.com/tradejournals/article/165359568.html.
16 See Herman Daly, Reconciling the Economics of Social Equity and Environmen-
tal Sustainability, 24 POPULATION & ENv'T. 47, 49-53 (Sept. 2002)(discussing the
WTO, IMF, World Bank, and other international institutions which use a top
down, debt based approach to "developing" countries); Douglas Kysar, The Eco-
nomic Dynamics of Environmental Law, 31 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 555, 557
(2004) ("with international action on climate change currently being thwarted by
the United States at least in part due to arguments premised on CBA, one sensibly
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human rights, and environmental violations abroad provide support to
the idea that selfishness is not the only motivating force of impor-
tance-capitalism itself requires other values.1 7 An entirely free mar-
ket, left to regulate itself, will only do so through market incentives.'
The revised cost-benefit paradigm advocated by ecological economists
such as Daly and Kysar accounts for worker's conditions and environ-
mental externalities." This helps narrow a gap between the decision-
making process and those adversely effected, which has been proven to
be toxic to a healthy, functional democracy.2 0
A. Our Economy is not Removed from the Planet's Laws of Ecology
Perhaps the biggest barriers to a sustainable economy that
supports sustainable development are the antiquated basic accounting
principles we use in determining economic indicators and developing
economic policy.2 ' The economy is generally viewed as a self-con-
tained system within which exchange value circulates between pro-
ducers and consumers.2 2 This "macroeconomic loop" takes no account
of the resource materials from which goods are produced, or the waste
might ask whether we are headed toward not just a cost-benefit state, but a cost-
benefit globe").
17 See SEN, supra note 12 (touching on business ethics, contracts, the Mafia, and
corruption. "Capitalism itself requires other values").
18 See, Douglas Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously, 112 HARv. L. REV. 1420,
at 1423-427 (1999).
19 See Daly, supra note 16. See generally David Driesen, Environmentalism, Free
Trade, and Democracy, 603 ANNALs Am AcAD. POL. & Soc. Sci.252-261 (Jan.
2006)(demonstrating how environmental laws are followed only to the extent that
the benefit outweighs the cost);PAUL HAWKEN, ET. AL, Natural Capitalism, (Back
Bay Books, 1999) (discussing the modern acceptance of waste as a byproduct of
production and consumption to naturally occurring Industrial Ecology and Eco-
nomics of the Steady-state.).
20 See SEN, supra note 12. See e.g., Compare bottom countries on Transparency
International,Corruption Perceptions Index 2010 Results, TRANSPARENCY INTER-
NATIONAL (Mar. 25, 2011), available at http://www.transparency.org/policy
research/surveys-indices/cpi/2010/results,, with UN Millineum Development
Goals Indicators, UNITIm NATIONS (Mar. 25, 2011 2:20 PM) http://unstats.un.org/
unsd/mdg/DataAvailability.aspx (looking at the countries with low transparency
and comparing them with countries that have lower standards of living demon-
strates that the least transparent governments are nearly the same with poor
standard of living indicators).
21 See Kysar, supra note 8. (discussing traditional accounting principles formed
when the earth had barely anybody on it, now over 5 billion due to unprecedented
growth).
22 Kysar, supra note 10, at 17.See also Herman Daly, Steady State Economics: A
New Paradigm, NEW LITERARY HISTORY, Autumn 1993, at 811-16 for a comprehen-
sive introduction to "steady-state" economics.
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matter into which goods are transformed during consumption.2 " Re-
source depletion, environmental pollution, impairment of necessary
environmental services, such as water filtration or carbon absorption,
or indeed any other relationship between economic activity and factors
outside of the narrow universe of value exchange are ignored by stan-
dard macroeconomics.2
This leads to a warped view of the global economy where values
are artificially inflated through discounting, market manipulation,
and exploitation." Daly describes globalization as a structure estab-
lished by "the big three world banks" to keep "the rich to grow rapidly
in order to provide markets in which the poor can sell their exports."2 6
He argues throughout his work that increasing overall wealth only
benefits wealthy, "developed" nations by keeping impoverished nations
perpetually in debt to major world development banks. 27 Being able to
keep and use their own resources in the developing world (where they
are desperately needed) and the U.S.'s inability to maintain a domestic
manufacturing sector are two disturbing results that lend support to
the necessity of revising our present accounting paradigm to at least
take into steady-state economics and accounting practices. 2 8 The ad-
vantages of "capabilities" over narrower measures of human develop-
23 Kysar, supra note 10, at 17-18. See generally Scott A. Davison, A Natural Law
Based Environmental Ethic, J. ETHICS & ENV., Spring 2009 (These facts are the
data for the insight into the sense and bounds of the class (persons, human beings)
of "others" in "good for oneself and others." Or again, facts about the limited supply
of resources and the limited strength of human will (the need for incentives, etc.)
make appropriation of resources to particular owners a normal requirement of jus-
tice to non-owners and owners alike.).
24 Kysar, supra note 10, at 18. "It is exactly as if a biology textbook proposed to
study an animal only in terms of its circulatory system, without ever mentioning
its digestive tract." Id. (citing Herman Daly, a major academic founder of environ-
mental economics as an independent discipline).
25 See Kysar, supra note 18, at 1423-27 (discussing discounting and exploitation).
See also, SEN, supra note 12 (discussing how problems such as "the persistence of
poverty, unfulfilled elementary needs, occurrence of famines and widespread hun-
ger, violation of elementary political freedoms and basic liberties, extensive neg-
lect of the interests and agency of women and worsening threats to our
environment and to the sustainability of our economic and social lives" are wors-
ened by the primary world development banks economic policy.).
26 See Daly, supra note 16, at 47-53 (discussing the WTO, IMF, World Bank, and
other international institutions which use a top down, debt based approach to fi-
nance development).
27 Id., at 47-49. ("It is thought that the only option poor countries have is to ex-
port to the rich, and to do that they have to accept foreign investment from corpo-
rations who know how to produce the high-quality stuff that the rich want.").
28 See Kysar, supra note 10, at 71 ("What seems needed is a body of market princi-
ples built on the assumptions that natural resources are limited, that ecosystem
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ment, such as the idea of "human capital," is a great step forward, but
is still too narrow in its restriction to effect production."
Detailed economic analysis of the steps and system required to
implement these changes are consistently present throughout eco-
nomic and environmental policy but are outside the scope of this pa-
per.3 0 Government regulation should aim to protect citizens through
transparency and public participation. A new combined approach must
capture the direct contribution of American creativity and innovation,
as well as our devotion to freedom and the impact it has on social
change.3 1 Additionally, domestic economic policy that inhibits creativ-
ity and innovation in the developing world will perpetuate low stan-
dards of living and social unrest on the national security radar of
American citizens and politicians.2
B. The U.S. Environmental Law "Pendulum"
An analysis of U.S. environmental regulations reveals a pendu-
lum effect, with legislation cycling between ambitious command-and-
control regulation and a hands-off approach to industry regulation.
The recent Toxic Substance Control Act ( "TSCA") reform highlights
this pattern of an industry that has used statutory loopholes to avoid
government regulations, and the subsequent legislative response.3 4
These reform efforts were triggered by heightened citizen awareness
and advocacy for increased public access to chemical data and a
services have value, and that the size of the human economy is a legitimate subject
for social control.).
29 See SEN supra note 12.
30 See Kysar, supra note 10,at 17. ("Section B. Some Fundamentals"). See also
Herman Daly, Sustainable Development: From Concept to Theory to Operational
Principles, 16 PoP. AND DEV. REV., 25, 26; see generally Bill Devall, The Deep,
Long-Range Ecology Movement: 1960-2000 -A Review, 6 J. ETHICS & ENv. 18 (We
are not separate from nature; harming it is the same as harming our own bodies.
Deep Ecology is the only monistic authority; our political system is secondary.)
31 See generally THOMAS FRIEDMAN, HoT, FLAT AND CROWDED (Picador 2009)(At
the heart of Friedman's argument is the notion that market demands drive inno-
vation, using an extended comparison between the financial crisis of 2008 and
global climate change, and suggests the need to transform American perception so
that the "Code Green" message is seen as a key to prosperity).
32 See, e.g., CIA WAR ON TERRORISM INDEX, available at https://www.cia.gov/news-
information/cia-the-war-on-terrorism/index.html and US STATE DEPARTMENT, EN-
ERGY SECURITY INDEX, available at http: /www.state.gov/ e leeb lesc /index. htm.
See also FRIEDMAN, supra note 31.
3 See generally ALLAN FREEZE, THE ENVIRONMENTAL PENDULUM: A QUEST FOR
TRUT ABOUT Toxic CHEMICALs 4-5 (2000).
34 Toxic Chemicals Safety Act of 2010, H.R. 5820, 111th Cong. (2010); Safe Chemi-
cals Act, S. 3209, 111th Cong. (2010).
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heightened standard of review for hazardous substances entering the
stream of commerce.:" While the statute requires testing and data
submission to the EPA before the use or manufacture of any new
chemicals or existing chemicals with proposed new uses, in practice
the TSCA has required little more of chemical production companies
beyond submitting this data, usually in a redacted form."
Congress passed the TSCA into law in 1976 to regulate new
and existing chemicals by compiling data regarding the effects of
chemical substances and mixtures on human health and the environ-
ment.17 Known for its contradictory nature, the TSCA represents the
balancing act needed to reduce the risk posed by hazardous chemicals
to human health and the environment while simultaneously mitigat-
ing any toll these measures may have on business and technological
innovation." The statute's frequent invocation of the "unreasonable
risk" standard indicates Congress favored a prudential approach to
any commercial or technological regulation over firm, safety-first en-
forcement." The EPA's primary control authority under the TSCA is
through testing and data submission requirements for any substance
that may pose a threat to human health or the environment (or will be
released in the environment in substantial quantities). 40 Congress
specifically instructs the EPA to oversee data development and pro-
35 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2695d (2011). See Cheryl Hogue, TSCA Reform: Group
Rallies for an Updated Chemical Law, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS (April 19,
2010), http://pubs.acs.org/isubscribe/journals/cen/88/il6/html/8816govlbox.html
(referring to "Safer Chemicals, Healthy Families," a broad coalition of environ-
mental and public health groups calling for reform) [hereinafter Updated Chemi-
cal Law]; Cheryl Hogue, Naming Names, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS (April
19, 2010), http://pubs.acs.org/isubscribe/journals/cen/88/il6/html/8816govl.html
[hereinafter Naming Names].
36 H.R. 5820 § 4(a)(2)(B). Proposed reform intends to strengthen this section so
that there is no risk found. See Enhancing EPA's Chemical Management Pro-
gram, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, (Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.epa.gov/
oppt/existingchemicals/pubs/enhanchems.html. See also Hogue, Naming Names,
supra note 35.
3 TSCA §2(b), 15 U.S.C.A § 2601 (West 2011).
38 WILLIAM RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: HORNBOOK SERIES 489-90 & n. 11
(1994).
39 TSCA §2(c), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2601(a) (West 2011)("It is the intent of Congress that
the Administrator [EPA] shall carry out this chapter in a reasonable and prudent
manner.").
40 TSCA §2(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2601(a) (West 2011)("The Congress finds that human
beings and the environment are being exposed to a large number of chemical sub-
stances and mixtures ... there are some whose manufacture, processing, distribu-
tion in commerce, use, or disposal may present an unreasonable risk of injury to
health or the environment; and the effective regulation of interstate commerce ne-
cessitates regulation of such chemicals and mixtures.").
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vides enforcement authority only when exercised in a manner that
does not "unduly impede" economic activities or technological
innovation.4 1
The current TSCA testing requirements contain loopholes used
by chemical manufactures to circumvent the testing process (for exam-
ple, asserting expired test data would still be "duplicative," and there-
fore exempt under Section 5(h)). After the EPA receives test data, a
notice is to be published in the Federal Register within 15 days of re-
ceipt.4 2 Each notice must identify the chemical substance or mixture,
list the uses or intended uses, and describe the nature of the test de-
veloped.4 3 The EPA puts this information online for anybody to ex-
amine.4 4 Because most of the TSCA actions relate to testing, the
majority of exemptions found in the statute are those for testing re-
quirements, found in Sections 4(c) and 5(h). 45 A particularly interest-
ing carve-out in the "Imminent Hazard" response strategy is the
omission of oil and petroleum products.4 6
The primary vehicle for risk-management under the TSCA is to
use the data submitted to the EPA by manufacturers to develop a "risk
assessment" on the proposed chemical.4 Manufacturers must notify
the EPA when manufacturing a substance whether or not the chemical
or the intended use is new and then wait for the Administrator to au-
thorize production before proceeding.4 8 Tests are required by rule to
determine whether the activities and production of the substance pre-
41 Id. Compare 2(b)(2)(requiring a balance of risk of injury to health and the envi-
ronment), with 2(b)(3)(requiring Administrator assurance that the authority
granted in §§ 2 (the statutes "primary purpose") does not "impede unduly" or cre-
ate "unnecessary economic barriers to technological innovation").
42 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a). See RODGERS, supra note 38, at 516 ("Regulation").
43 15 U.S.C. § 2603(d). See also 15 U.S.C. § 2613; See Hogue, supra note 2. See
generally, U.S. EPA, TSCA CBI PROTECTION MANUAL, October 20, 2003.
44 "Envirofacts Database" (available at, http://www.epa.gov/enviro/facts/tsca/tsca
search.html).
45 Section 5 exemptions are permitted if the party applying for exemption can
show the use and production of the substances will not present any unreasonable
risk. The Administrator may also exempt any person from the requirement of
Subsection 4(b)(2) to submit data if she concludes data has already been submitted
for an equivalent chemical substance.
46 The responsive measures under Sections 6 and 7 will experience little impact
under the proposed reform. See Hogue, supra note 35.
47 See RODGERs, supra note 38, at 492 (citing National Academy of Sciences, Com-
mission on Life Sciences, Risk Assessment in the Federal Government)("[risk as-
sessment] is the use of the factual base to define the health effects of exposure of
individuals or populations to hazardous materials and situations").
48 TSCA § 5(f).
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sent a reasonable risk of injury to human health or the environment.4 9
The Administrator has the authority to review the adequacy of the
data development standards (required at least once a year) and can
institute proceedings to make appropriate revisions to the standards if
necessary.so
The TSCA is a relatively untouched statute, believed to have
done little in practice to regulate hazardous chemicals entering the
stream of commerce." While largely unchanged since it's passing in
1976, currently a host of citizens groups, legislators, and chemical in-
dustry interest groups are involved in efforts to revise the TSCA.52
The main EPA control under the TSCA is toxic substance regulation
through the collection and dissemination of information on the hazard-
ous nature of the chemical substances. 3 Regulators and workers in
the chemical industry use critical confidential information for safety
measures, and any information not designated as confidential is to be
made available to the general public.5 4
At its formation, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)
and the National Environmental Policy Act's (NEPA) passing marked
a period of increased federal government policy dedicated to environ-
mental protection.55 At the request of President Nixon, Roy L. Ash
took a sweeping look at organizational problems throughout the fed-
49 See National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(f) (1969) (
EPA's primary statutory mandate "to declare a national policy which will en-
courage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment. To
promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and
biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man.").
50 15 U.S.C. § 2603(b)(2)(B); see also Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C.
§2614 ("Prohibited Acts") and § 2615 ("Penalties") (for revision proceedings and
actions for failure to comply with the Administrator's rules).
51 Amended at, P.L. 99-519 (1986); P.L. 100-551 (1988); P.L. 101-637 (1990); P.L.
102-550 (1992); see RODGERS, supra note 38, at 493 (citing H.R.Rep No. 94-1341,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1976))("Because of the lack of testing by manufactuers and
processors of chemicals to determine their health and environmental effects, the
general population and the environment now serve as the laboratory for discover-
ing adverse health and environmental effects").
52 See generally Hogue, supra note 35.
53 15 U.S.C. § 2601(2)(c) (1976) (The statute places a congressional check on the
EPA Administrator's authority to act by mandating that he shall carry out actions
in a "reasonable and prudent manner," balancing environment, social, and eco-
nomic impacts).
54 15 U.S.C. § 2613(c) (1976).
5s 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1969) (Two of NEPA's stated purposes are ". . .[tlo declare a
national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between
man and his environment; [and] to promote efforts which will prevent or elimi-
nate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and wel-
fare of man. . ").
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eral government.s" The memo with his findings is now regarded as a
pivotal component to the development of an independent agency de-
voted to environmental protection.s" The Ash memo specifically recog-
nizes "key standard-setting functions should be performed outside the
agencies whose interests may affect those standards. . .we regard the
EPA as the strongest organizational alternative."" The need for inde-
pendent safety standards and oversight became apparent early in the
life of the EPA, especially concerning agencies with close ties to the
private sector.5 9
C. Failure to Prevent Conflicts of Interests from Weakening Policy
Government regulations that require harm disclosure from
companies and organizations that pose a risk to citizens are necessary
for public safety but have benefits for high-risk industries as well."o In
order to make effective policy decisions, companies want and need con-
sistency and predictability with government permitting and risk man-
agement regulations." The petroleum industry, for example, has
reached a point where companies must perform increasingly risky and
dangerous operations to satisfy the insatiable demand for crude oil.6 2
The process for oil extraction is complex and dangerous, and has
evolved at a much quicker rate than the corresponding agency frame-
work responsible for its leasing and permitting.
EPA authorizing statutes regulating large-scale risk contain
exemptions for the petroleum industry stipulated in their key defini-
56 President Nixon called for a "strong, independent agency" to establish and en-
force environmental protection standards, conduct environmental research, and
assist the CEQ in developing and recommending to the President new policies for
environmental protection. EVNTL.PROT. AGENCY, EPA Order 1110.2,, INITIAL OR-
GANIZATION OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (1970), available at http:/
/www.epa.gov/history/org/origins/1110_2.htm.
5 Memorandum from Roy L. Ash, Chairman of Exec. Advisory Council on Exec.
Org., to the President of the U.S. (Apr. 29, 1970), available at http://www.epa.gov/
history/org/origins/ash.htm [hereinafter Ash Council Memo].
5 See id.
59 Id.
60 See Liability Issues Surrounding the Gulf Coast Oil Disaster:HearingBefore the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 2 (2010) (statement of Rachel Giesber
Clingman, Co-Gen. Counsel, Transocean).
61 Kovski, supra note 7, at A-9, (July 1, 2010)("Industry does not have the ability
to deal with this kind of blowout scenario.").
62 Id.
63 See generally DEP'T OF INTERIOR, MINERALS MGMT. SERV., OCS STUDY MMS 2004-
049, HISTORY OF THE OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY IN SOUTHERN LOUISIANA,
(2004)(noting specifically in Section 5.1.4. the large geologic and economic risks
present in deepwater drilling).
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tions while the Department of the Interior (DOI) manages petroleum
extraction leasing and government oversight of the extraction pro-
cess." The Minerals Mining Service (MMS) was established to extract
valuable minerals from federal lands to (indirectly) add revenues to
the US Treasury.6 5 Increased revenue and environmental safety en-
forcement are two essential elements of a successful mineral extrac-
tion regulatory scheme; a stronger, more functional pre-extraction
regulatory system may have helped expose the rampant conflicts of
interest and enforcement gaps throughout the MMS." Looking at pat-
terns throughout U.S. Environmental policy lends support to the argu-
ment that transparency and public participation assurance are the
best forms of government oversight."
In looking at the measures taken by environmental responsive
legislation, it is helpful to ask whether or not increased command and
control regulation context has done anything (in TSCA's case) to re-
duce harmful pollution. The primary arguments for establishing a
new, independent agency were that "first, the primary mission of each
existing department would bias any decisions it made on a govern-
ment-wide basis concerning the environment; second, the same factors
might raise questions about the objectivity of any existing department
as a standard-setting body for other agencies and departments."" It is
apparent how important it is for government regulations to expose
conflicts of interest and increase transparency assurance when an
evaluation of a variety of economic results produced by current na-
tional accounting measures, would strike non-economists as odd."
64 See, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabil-
ity Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1980) (defining the term 'hazardous substance' as and
precluding petroleum, including crude or any fraction thereof which is not other-
wise specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance"), RCRA ("unless
the administrator determines otherwise as may be necessary to protect human
health and the environment, this subsection shall not apply to fuels produced from
petroleum.").
65 See ROBERT UTLEY & BARRY MACINTOSH, THE DEPARTMENT OF EVERYTHING
ELSE: HIGHLIGHTS OF INTERIOR HIsTORY (1989), available at http://www.nps.gov/
history/history/online-books/utley-mackintoshlinterior6.htm. (stating "The Miner-
als Management Service, established by secretarial order in 1982, handles the de-
partment's oil and gas leasing responsibilities on the Outer Continental Shelf and
collects all lease and royalty revenues from both onshore and offshore mining.").
66 See Liability Issues Surrounding the Gulf Coast Oil Disaster:HearingBefore the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 2 (2010) (statement of Rachel Giesber
Clingman, Co-Gen. Counsel, Transocean).
67 See supra note 20.
68 Id.
69 See Kysar, supra note 10, at 29 (noting that Superfund contributors muster $31
billion needed to clean some of the worst locations on the E.P.A.'s list of nearly
40,000 hazardous waste sites).
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The "GNP" considers views of expenditure and increases in economic
welfare, but ignores basic accounting principles by treating unsustain-
able exploitation of natural capital as pure income. 70
D. When the Nature of an Industry's Regulatory Body Is Set up to
Mirror the Industry Itself, Conflict of Interest is Inevitable
Since 1983, the MMS has existed in order to keep valuable nat-
ural resources from sitting idle underground and to contribute royalty
monies to the US Treasury.71 Environmental protection, conservation,
and safety-standards for what we now know to be an enormous risk to
human health and the environment were flushed out later. However,
they did not function adequately to reduce the risk of a disaster arising
not from an act of God, but in the normal course of business.7 2
The MMS managed all royalties, sales, and contracts between
the federal government and petroleum extraction corporations.7 ' The
incentive for a department that controls every aspect of such a lucra-
tive process is to increase extraction capacity.74 MMS employees were
admittedly detached and disconnected from agencies responsible for
oil spill disaster response and cleanup.15 Cleanup response was han-
dled by the EPA and other federal agencies and financed by the "re-
sponsible party."7 Public and private investigations revealed a
70 Id. Centuries of logging and construction have resulted in the loss of all but 1%
to 5- of the original forest cover of the United States, yet increased GNP has made
no allowance along the way for the depreciation of scarce natural capital."
71 See UTLEY & MCINTOSH, supra note 65.
72 See Id. See also Diane Austin et. al., History of Offshore Oil and Gas Industry
in Southern Louisiana: Interim Report, Vol. 1: Papers on the Evolving Offshore
Industry (DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, July, 2004).
7:3 See Memorandum from Earl E. Devaney, U.S. Inspector Gen., to Dirk
Kempthorne, U.S. Sec. of Interior (Sept. 9, 2008), available at http://media.wash
ingtonpost.com/wp-srv/investigative/documents/OlGcover-090908.pdf. According
to statistics maintained by the MMS, the Royalty in Kind ("RIK") program is re-
sponsible for the sale of "over 800 million cubic feet of natural gas and 150,000
barrels of oil every day. The value of RIK, oil and gas sales in fiscal year (FY) 2006
was reported at over $4 billion, or approximately $11 million per day."
7 U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, INVESTIGATIVE
REPORT OF MMS Oi1 MARKETING GRouP - LAKEWOOD, 10 (2008) [hereinafter Lake-
wood Report] (DOI-MMS exerted control over every aspect of extraction. RIK Pro-
gram employees work in four separate areas: the "Front Office" which markets
and sells oil and gas; the "Mid Office," which handles contracting, risk control, and
credit issues; the "Back Office,' which handles accounting functions; and the "Eco-
nomic Analysis Office," which helps evaluate bids and measure the performance of
RIK contracts.).
7 See id at 1-2.
6 See Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, § 1006 (1990) (giving the
EPA reactive authority for oil spill response and clean-up). See also Comprehen-
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"culture of corruption" within the agency.7 7 MMS employees were
given money, gifts and vacations in return for assistance with stream-
lining the leasing process and with navigating the environmental reg-
ulations applicable to petroleum extraction.
A series of MMS policy decisions directly impacted the recent
disaster in the Gulf Coast.7 ' A particularly concerning example of
MMS assistance with avoiding safety regulations is the waiver
granted by the Interior Department to BP exempted the company from
a detailed environmental analysis and concluded the spill risk in that
part of the Gulf was "minimal or nonexistent."so Additionally, the
white house Council on Environmental Quality is reviewing the off-
shore oil and natural gas policies and practices of the MMS under
NEPA.8 '
Interior Secretary Ken Salazar issued an order on May 11th,
2010 breaking the MMS into three bureaus and then asked for 29 mil-
lion dollars to help with the Department's reorganization.8 2 In his
sive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9601
(1980)(defining the term 'hazardous substance'. .does not include petroleum, in-
cluding crude or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise specifically listed or
designated as a hazardous substance.").
77 Devaney, supra note 73, at 1-3.
7 See Lakewood Report, supra note 74. ("Due to the nature of their responsibili-
ties, RIK oil and gas marketers interact extensively with oil and gas industry rep-
resentatives. .Our investigation revealed that many RIK employees simply felt
that federal government ethics standards and DOI policies were not applicable to
them because of their "unique" role in MMS ... many RIK employees said they felt
that in order to effectively perform their official duties, they needed to interact in
social settings with industry representatives to obtain "market intelligence." Some
felt their free attendance at industry functions was an absolute necessity given
that it was industry's practice to conduct business over lunch, dinner, and golf
outings.").
7 See Liability Issues Surrounding the Gulf Coast Oil Disaster: Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 2 (2010) (statement of Rachel Giesber
Clingman, Co-Gen. Counsel, Transocean). (In 2003, the Interior Department de-
cided that remote-control shut-off switches would not be required as a last resort
against underwater spills. The MMS then failed to suggest other "fail-safe" mecha-
nisms after a 2004 report raised questions about the reliability of the remote-con-
trol devices.).
s0 Richard Dunham & Stewart Powell, Critics Blame Energy Lobby for Lax Safety
Rules, THE CHRON, May 8, 2010, available at http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/
business/deepwaterhorizon/6996736.html.
at Review of MMS NEPA Policies, Practices, and Procedures, for OCS Oil and Gas
Exploration Development, 75 Fed. Reg. 29996 (May 28, 2010).
82 As part of the department's reform, Salazar said the President's 2011 budget
includes a ten-percent increase in the number of inspectors and includes $29 mil-
lion to fund near-term resources for agency restructuring. See U.S. DEP'T. OF INTE-
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Secretarial Order breaking up the MMS, Salazar explicitly stated the
need to "separate and reassign responsibilities of MMS into structures
that will improve management, oversight, and accountability of activi-
ties on the Outer Continental Shelf. . and provide independent safety
and environmental oversight and enforcement of offshore activities."
The House and Senate Bills in response to the BP Deepwater Horizon
disaster (hereinafter "BP disaster") generally proposed increased Na-
tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration ("NOAA") and Coast
Guard authority in response to oil spills. The Securing Health for
Ocean Resources and Environment ("SHORE") Act would require the
Department of the Interior (hereinafter DOI) to respond to concerns of
the Coast Guard and NOAA before a drilling permit could be
granted.84
Recent responsive legislation is now attempting to close some
of the gaps in financial regulatory schemes through transparency mea-
sures and investor protection. The SOX and Dodd-Frank are examples
of Congressional response to corporate scandals." The most widely
felt impact of Dodd-Frank was its creation of the "Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau."" SOX, enacted largely in response to the Enron,
WorldCom (MCI), and Global Crossing scandals, has been described as
the, "most sweeping and significant change in securities law since the
1930's."" The increased regulation of business and accounting prac-
tices has received negative criticism from business, especially regard-
ing the increased regulation, increased compliance costs, corporate
federalism, and lack of clarity.8 " In 2003, a study of internal audit
directors anticipated many of the challenges facing the accounting pro-
RIOR, ORDER NO. 3299, ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BUREAU OF OCEAN AND ENERGY
MANAGEMENT, THE BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIORNMENTAL ENFORCEMENT, AND
THE OFFICE OF NATURAL RESOURCEs REVENUE (2010); ). See also, Linda Roeder,
Newly Reorganized Agency Must Address Long-Standing Deficiencies, [July] Daily
Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 140, at A-21, (July 23, 2010). ("As part of the department's
reform, Salazar said the president's 2011 budget includes a 10 percent increase in
the number of inspectors and includes $29 million to fund near-term resources for
agency restructuring").
83 See ORDER NO. 3299, supra note 81.
84 Lynn Garner, Oil Spills: Senate Commerce Beefs up Authority For Coast Guard,
NOAA over Oil Spills, [July] Daily Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 140, at A-20, (July 23,
2010)("The SHORE Act would require Interior to respond to concerns of the Coast
Guard and NOAA before a drilling permit could be granted. It would also increase
resources for the two agencies to respond to oil spills").
85 SOX, supra note 2; see also Parles et al., supra note 15, at 1.
86 See Summary of Dodd-Frank, supra note 14.
87 Parles et al., supra note 15, at 1.
88 Id. at 1-2 (noting that the legislation began to regulate a profession that had
previously been self-regulated by the American Institute of Certified Public Ac-
countants (AICPA)).
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fession, particularly all aspects of auditing."' This study predicted the
role of the internal auditors would expand to evaluate, among other
areas, the internal controls and interpretation of SOX and other SEC
rules.90
Following the enactment of SOX, the role of the auditor
changed."' SEC Commissioner Harvey Goldschmid emphasized this
changed role when he "reminded auditors that the investing public
views them as gatekeepers."9 2 Government is and always will be
needed to deal with issues that require cooperation and impact other
nation-states, but the role and efficacy of quick-fix type regulation
must be addressed.
II. THE MOST IMPORTANT ROLE OF THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT IS TO ASSURE TRANSPARENCY, PROTECT
AGAINST CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, AND INCREASE
INDIVIDUAL AGENCY.
Success and failure of regulatory regimes can be traced to in-
centives, ranging from short gain to long-range sustainable preserva-
tion." Regulatory responses that make business difficult through
sanctions and regulation may provide lucrative avenues for those able
to circumvent impediments to business or "progress."9 4 The 2007 cri-
sis exposed how vulnerable the United States is to shortsighted and
greedy factions." Unites States citizens are becoming increasingly




93 See Herman Daly, Steady-State Economics versus Growthmania: A Critique of
the Orthodox Conceptions of Growth, Wants, Scarcity, and Efficiency, 5 J. POL. SCI.
2, 149-167 (Jun. 1974); See also, Douglas Kysar, Symposium: Intergenerational
Equity and Discounting. .on Stilts, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 119 (Winter, 2007)(noting
how discounting has the practical effect of "dramatically diminishing the apparent
significance of policy effects on future generations in the context of problems such
as climate change, species extenction, deforestation, and aquifer depletion.").
9 See Vincent Cable, What is International Economic Security?, 71 J. INT. AFF.
No. 2, 305 at 321-323 (Apr. 1995)("The emerging 'black market' in CFCs (circum-
venting the terms of the Montreal Protocol) could, in this sense, be seen as much
as a security threat as narcotics smuggling"). See generally, Valerie Jenness, Ex-
plaining Criminalization: From Demography and Status Politics to Globalization
and Modernization, 30 ANN. REV. Soc. 147 (2004).
9 These factions, such as those who peddled sub-prime mortgages and toxic as-
sets to clients and consumers, are arguably responsible for the crisis. See FCIC
REPORT, supra note 2, at xvii-xix (comprehensive analysis of root causes of the
2007 disaster); see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 30 (comparing the financial crisis of
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aware as a society that sustainability is a desirable aim throughout all
facets of the economy, government, and banking system."
How we as a nation respond to this crisis will define our gener-
ation. A response stemming from a fundamental paradigm shift in
how we view commodities, wealth, and progress is necessary now more
than ever as we take legal and legislative steps to protect and regulate
the economy. Large-scale famine has never happened in a democracy
and is unlikely, because it can only happen in authoritarian systems
lacking openness of information and transparency." In the United
States, transparency through citizens' close proximity to the decision-
making process is one example of the political freedoms which keep
the developed world from experiencing famine.9 " Rights such as free-
dom of expression and discussion "are not only pivotal in inducing so-
cial responses to economic needs, but are also central to the
conceptualization of economic needs themselves."99 Dialogue is impor-
tant to support the effective functioning of a democracy; formal rules
are not enough without good democratic practice. 0 0
The parallels between the root cause and connections of finan-
cial and environmental crises are visible in everything from the news
to CIA national security briefings and State Department reports1 o0
Part Two of this paper will apply the analysis from Part One to the
apparent progression in environmental policy to the recent reaction of
the U.S. government to the 2007 financial crisis. Regulation by top-
down control can be more harmful than beneficial because it creates
an incentive for bad practice. 1 0 2 International criminalization is com-
2008 with global climate change, which is unlikely to be realized until the next big
disaster or meltdown).
96 See, e.g., HAWKEN, supra note 18, at 321-22.
9 SEN, supra note 11, at 16.
98 See id.
9 Id. at 154. Sen maintains that the opposition between economic needs and po-
litical freedoms are illusory and reminds us that democracy, as well as being an
end result of individual freedom, plays an instrumental role in giving people a
voice and constructive role in shaping values and norms. See generally id.
100 See id. at 168-69. Sen's notable work on famine explains how they are rarely
caused by food shortage, and how these are usually caused by a lack of purchasing
power or entitlements. Id. at 168-69. Sen argues these are easy and cheap to
avoid through state employment schemes, an example of a particularly straight-
forward approach. Id. at 160-88.
101 See supra note 32 (noting the environmental components on the CIA WAR ON
TERRORISM INDEX and the US STATE DEPARTMENT, ENERGY SECURITY INDEX).
102 See Cable, supra note 94. See, e.g., Kysar, supra note 17, at 1423.
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plex, and criminal enforcement on an international level is nearly
impossible.1 0 3
A. Citizen Gap Closing: Freedom, Transparency, Individual Agency
The key component of the TSCA is how the testing require-
ments ultimately shift the burden of proof regarding the safety of a
substance (necessary in order to move forward with production or use)
permanently on to the manufacturer."o4 The data is ultimately com-
piled to make a formal risk assessment for EPA review. If the EPA
requires more information, or makes a finding of unreasonable risk,
the manufacturer must produce additional evidence of the substance's
safety to discharge the burden of proof to move forward.'" The Ad-
ministrator may take measures against such risk using the "least bur-
densome requirement" and require the manufacturer to notify the
local state authorities where the required disposal may occur. Any
person is entitled to a hearing if there is a dispute of any material
fact. 106
Industry has historically found ways to avoid releasing specific
information on a chemical or a company, contrary to Section 5(b) and 8
requirements. 107 Using a Section 8(e) claim, companies routinely
make "Confidential Business Information" ("CBI") claims to maintain
confidentiality of the actual chemical identity, manufacturer's name,
and chemical structure. 108 The proposed policy reform aims to end
the practice of using the CBI exemption for information already avail-
able to the public on the TSCA inventory.' 09 The statute contains
written measures to promote awareness and a democratic process re-
garding potentially hazardous substances that may enter the stream
103 See Jamie Mayerfeld, Who Shall Be Judge?: The United States, the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, and the Global Enforcement of Human Rights, 25 Hum.
RTs. Q. 93, 121 (2003).
104 See RODGERS, supra note 38, at 493; see also Lisa P. Jackson, Adm'r, Envtl.
Prot. Agency, Remarks to the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco (Sept. 29,
2009), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/8d49f7ad4bbcf4ef8
52573590040b7f6/fc4e2a8cO5343b3285257640007081c5!OpenDocument (propos-
ing an increase in the burden of proof to manufacturers in that the manufacturers
must prove that the substance is safe, instead of proving does not propose an im-
mediate threat to safety).
105 Toxic Substances Control Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 2603 (1976).
1oe See Hogue, Naming Names, supra note 35.
107 See RODGERS, supra note 38, at 493. The data reports are the crux of the act
and are responsible for establishing a prima facie case on the safety of a proposed
substance. Id.
1os TSCA § 8(e). See Hogue, Naming Names, supra note 35.
109 See Enhancing EPA's Chemical Management Program, supra note 36.
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of commerce. "o With information and technology paving the present
political landscape, the public needs and demands access to this infor-
mation more than ever.
The proposed reform addresses this loophole by empowering
citizens to strengthen the regulatory intent present in the findings and
policy language of the TSCA. Increasing accountability through citi-
zen awareness and involvement is a more holistic approach which
aims beyond pollution permit writing and data collection to preemp-
tively reduce pollution. 1 ' Public activism and awareness is helping to
close a long-standing gap between the statute's intended purpose and
the actual industry practice.112 Current incentives encourage compa-
nies to claim that a proposed substance is not new or for new use or to
label their submitted data as CBI."" This way, they only have to sub-
mit a redacted report (i.e., a report without the exact chemical content
and the company name) to the EPA in order to be published in the
Federal Register." 4
These reform efforts, lead by Congressman Rush and Senator
Waxman, have received a good deal of media coverage and helped
spread awareness of the amount toxic substances that permeate our
daily lives.' The TCSA generally aims to increase EPA authority in
hazardous chemical regulation, and evaluate chemicals by their effect
on human health and safety before allowing their insertion in the
110 Id.
111 The procedure and steps necessary to collect and report data are enumerated
in Sections 8 and 14. Companies may claim a range of sensitive, proprietary infor-
mation as CBI in order to protect intellectual property rights and trade secrets.
Under Section 8(e), companies that manufacture, process, or distribute chemicals
are required to immediately provide notice to EPA if they learn that a chemical
presents a substantial risk of injury to health or the environment. See TSCA §§ 8,
14.
112 See Hogue, TSCA Reform, supra note 35.
113 See Hogue, Naming Names, supra note 35.
114 Id. This is one of the most important elements to transparency assurance
under TSCA. With no testing expenses, there is a quicker production time frame.
11"5 See Cheryl Hogue, Chemicals Regulation: Legislation: Industry, Activists Seek
Changes to Congress' Proposals for the Toxic Substances Control Act, CHEMICAL &
ENGINEERING NEWS, Apr. 26, 2010, at 7, available at http://pubs.acs.org/isubscribe/
journals/cen/88/il7/html/8817notwl.html. See generally Charles Duhigg, Debating
How Much Weed Killer Is Safe in Your Water Glass, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2009)
(discussing how the popular weed killer atrazine may be more dangerous than
previously thought); Hogue, Naming Names, supra note 35 (regarding group pro-
tests over "company sanitized" data reports on new chemicals which frequently
lack the name and company of the substance); Green Product Innovation Institute,
http://gpinnovation.org/about.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (referencing GPII
Green Products Innovation Institute, a California non-profit that extends the
"Cradle to Cradle" framework and administers the certification standard).
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stream of commerce. The Waxman-Rush legislation would require all
chemicals to which people are exposed to be reviewed for safety, ex-
pand EPA authority to compel chemical testing, and "[e]stablish an
expedited process for EPA to reduce exposure to chemical substances
that are known to be persistent, bioaccumulative, and toxic.""' In an
attempt to increase incentives for innovation and investment in the
chemical industry, the EPA Administrator seeks to create a review
process for safer alternatives to existing chemicals, promoting innova-
tion, and investment in green chemistry."' The driving force behind
the proposed legislation was public disclosure and awareness of the
true content of hazardous chemicals, in a similar vein to the push for
accounting transparency in the SOX legislation.'
B. Financial Legislative Response
The public access to chemical content, intended use, and test-
ing methods, provide a check on the industry by influencing consumer
demand for safe products from reliable companies.1 9 There is limited
EPA authority regarding pre-emptive regulation. Their role is prima-
rily delegated to controlling and collecting data on the chemicals in the
stream of commerce, than collecting and disseminating the informa-
tion.12 0 These specific regulations and sanctions for noncompliance
are secondary to concerns over chemical industry innovation and pro-
duction.121 However, increasing media and citizens' group attention
on the importance of public chemical safety awareness indicate that
the industry accountability measures already existing in the statute
were meant as regulating measures by providing transparency for the
general public.' 2 2 Increased public information access is just one issue
116 Committee on Energy and Commerce, H.R. 5820: "The Toxic Chemicals Safety
Act of 2010," http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/index.php?q=bill/hr-
5820-the-the-toxic-chemicals-safety-act-of-2010 (last visited 4/08/11). See Toxic
Chemicals Safety Act of 2010, H.R. 5820, 111th Cong. § 32 (2010).
117 See Jackson, supra note 104.
11s See TCSA § 2.
119 See generally Hogue, Naming Names, supra, note 35.
120 See LINDA-JO SCHIEROW, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE Toxic CONTROL ACT: A
SUMMARY OF THE ACT AND ITS MAJOR REQUIREMENTS 1 (2009). The PCB regula-
tions under 6(e) impose specific regulation plans for asbestos (Title II), radon (Title
III), and lead exposure (Title IV).
121 See RODGERS, supra note 37, at 493, note 31 (citing H.R.Rep No. 94-1341, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1976), in Legis.Hist. at 413 ("Because of the lack of testing by
manufacturers and processors of chemicals to determine their health and environ-
mental effects, the general population and the environment now serve as the labo-
ratory for discovering adverse health and environmental effects.").
122 Cf RODGERS, supra note 38; Hogue, TSCA Reform, supra note 35.
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addressed by current reform efforts, but is critical to the overall suc-
cess of hazardous chemical regulation. 12 3
Throughout regulation on corporate responsibility, conflicts of
interest, and criminal penalties, transparency requires that public
companies have audit committees that will take charge of the audit
and the selection of the auditors.124 Two controversial SOX provisions
(section 302 and section 906) require CEOs and CFOs to certify that
the company's SEC filings are accurate.12 5 Failure to do so carries
criminal penalties. 12 6 In addition, Congress authorized increased
criminal penalties for existing crimes and created new securities
crimes.' 7 Title VII of SOX is "entitled 'The Corporate Criminal Fraud
Accountability Act of 2002,' and creates criminal liability for alteration
of documents."12 8
BP obtained its lease from an MMS service that admittedly felt
it was their duty to streamline extraction, increase capacity, navigate
petroleum lease markets, and avoid environmental regulations.129
The part of the MMS responsible for streamlining the BP lease be-
lieved itself to act as an extension of the industry itself.1 3 0 "The MMS
develops environmental impact statements on each five-year offshore
oil and gas program, and it developed a multi-lease sale environmental
impact statement covering a group of 11 lease sales that included the
BP site where the spill occurred.a1 3  A relatively short environmental
statement for the specific lease won by BP followed. In that "tiered"
system, MMS decided the BP project, like other individual projects,
needed no separate environmental analysis, so it was given a categori-
cal exclusion." 13 2
123 Id.
124 See e.g., SOX § 301, supra note 2; Parles et al., supra note 15.
125 SOX §§ 302, 906. See Parles et al., supra note 15 (noting that these sections
require CEOs and CFOs to sign two separate certifications in their companies'
reports to the SEC).
126 Id. (noting that SOX § 601 authorized large budgetary increases for the SEC,
particularly in enforcement).
127 Parles et al., supra, note 15.
128 Id.
129 See Kempthorne, supra, note 73.
1so Id.
131 Alan Kovski and Lynn Garner, Gulf Spill Brings Calls for Better Safegaurds,
Criticism of NEPA Categorical Exclusions, [May] Daily Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 89,
at A-10, (May 11, 2010).
132 Id.
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C. The Pollution Prevention Act as an Example of an Alternative
Statutory Attempt at Control by Encouraging Voluntary
Reporting, Information Gathering, and Public-Private
Partnerships
The passage of the Pollution Prevention Act in 1990 marked a
shift from command and control regulation to the use of market mech-
anisms and incentives intended to encourage voluntary compliance. 3 3
The broad scope of the policy section suggests Congress intended to
leave room for interpretation within state and local government pollu-
tion control measures (requiring only that pollution be reduced or pre-
vented "whenever feasible"). 1 34 Increasing difficulty in federal grants
acquisition combined with the broad statutory language has helped
foster creativity and innovation in state and local pollution prevention
schemes.' The PPA contains no explicit language granting the EPA
power to enforce compliance and issue sanctions. 13 6 As the action in
the statute moves from the state-level up, information dissemination
and state-matching grants are the main objectives of EPA authority.
The statute's language calls for voluntary commitment to pol-
lution reduction across media, government, and private sector divi-
sions.1 3 7 The EPA is required to compile and disseminate strategic
information to help prevent pollution "at the source through cost-effec-
tive changes in production, operation, and raw materials use."' The
language acknowledges a historical lack of emphasis on multi-media
management of pollution in existing statutes and calls on the EPA to
address pollution as a whole.1 3 9 Early EPA enabling statutes relied
primarily on command-and-control mechanisms and less on voluntary
133 Pollution Prevention Act of 1990, § 6604 (b)(10) Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat.
1388 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13101) [hereinafter PPA] (stating that the
EPA Administrator shall "identify and make recommendations to Congress to
eliminate barriers to source reduction including the use of incentives and disincen-
tives"). See generally CELIA CAMPBELL-MOHN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: FROM
RESOURCES TO RECOVERY 40-46 (1993).
134 PPA §§ 6602-6604.
135 Telephone Interview with Dianne Wilkins, Envtl. Programs Manager, Okla.
Dep't of Envtl. Quality (June 29, 2010) (discussing state pollution prevention mea-
sures efforts and issues arising from lack of federal funding).
136 PPA §6604(b) ("The Administrator shall develop and implement a strategy to
promote source reduction.").
137 Id.
138 Id. § 6602(a)(2).
139 Id. § 6602(a)(3-4) ("The Environmental Protection Agency needs to address the
historical lack of attention to source reduction.").
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measures and partnerships for pollution control.1 4 0 The PPA is writ-
ten to address the policy gaps arising between pollution command-
and-control regulation and the need for pre-emptive pollution reduc-
tion strategy.
Information and funds are dispersed to state and local busi-
nesses, governments, and organizations to ensure progress is being
made under the federally funded schemes.1 4 1 Although innovative
strategies may arise through resource scarcity in statewide programs,
the success and failure of these pollution prevention programs depends
on adequate funding."" Measurable goals are essential to the PPA
federal grant application process because they provide an objective
standard for the federal government when evaluating these programs
and providing grants. 14 3
The Source Reduction Clearinghouse in Section 6602 assists
information exchange about the different source reduction techniques,
ensures that the information is extended to businesses, and provides
technical assistance to businesses.1 4 4 At the same time, it also consid-
ers the capabilities of various businesses to make use of the tech-
niques.1 4 5 Federal grants are more difficult to obtain under the PPA
than under other waste management statutes such as Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act ("RCRA")' 4 6 and Comprehensive Environ-
140 See, e.g., RODGERS, supra note 38, at 58-61 (discussing the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act and the balance of "trade secrets" with the transparency of company
practices).
141 The EPA's primary function under the PPA is to provide resources (namely
grants under Section 6605) and information to states about the implementation of
voluntary, pre-emptive, pollution source reduction strategies. See PPA § 6605.
142 See Wilkins interview, supra note 135 (noting how pollution prevention pro-
fessionals tend to be forward thinking and innovative, likely resulting from having
to always work with limited support and funding. "Much of the discussion arising
in the larger Environmental Community frequently comes up in P2 communities
3-5 years beforehand.").
143 Funding for pollution prevention schemes are available to states, businesses,
and local governments in the form of "state matching grants" pursuant to Section
6604(b)(5). PPA § 6604(b)(5). Section 6 is especially important because it requires
proposed reduction methods applying for federal grants to indicate measurable
pollution reduction goals. Id. § 6604(b)(6).
144 The "Source Reduction Clearinghouse" contains data on the success and fail-
ure of pollution prevention programs funded by the State matching grants. See id.
§ 6602(b)(5) (stating that the Administrator shall "[d]evelop improved methods of
coordinating, streamlining and assuring public access to data collected under Fed-
eral environmental statutes.").
145 id.
"" Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6931 (2002) (stating that
the EPA must "make grants to the States for purposes of assisting the States in
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mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA").1 47
Under the PPA, the EPA is required to collect and make readily avail-
able information to state governments and the private sector."1 ' The
recipients of the state matching grants are "State Technical Assistance
Programs," which then collect and distribute information and thus
help foster technological innovation and increase efficiency. 149
D. A Shift in Regulatory Focus as Seen in the Use of Multi-Media
Management
The success or failure of the PPA in reducing pollution at the
source depends upon gathering and reporting information. By looking
at the pollution problem as a whole, the PPA addresses the problems
with traditional single-medium pollution control measures, which
some claim simply moves waste from one medium to another.o50 The
multi-media approach looks at the issue as a whole to address our
throwaway culture through measureable reduction progress. Collect-
ing and disseminating data on the success and failure of individual
reduction programs ideally enables the EPA to trace gradual behav-
ioral changes and eventually compile statistical indicators to measure
increased awareness of pollution reduction options. The information
provided aims to satisfy industry's demand for information and techni-
cal assistance to overcome institutional barriers to the adoption of
source reduction practices.1 5 1
Pollution prevention techniques and information spread be-
yond the EPA when submitted to the Pollution Prevention Information
the development and implementation of authorized State hazardous waste
programs.").
147 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42
U.S.C. § 9628 (2002).
148 PPA § 6604.
149 PPA § 6602(a)(3) ("The opportunities for source reduction are often not real-
ized because existing regulations, and the industrial resources they require for
compliance, focus upon treatment and disposal, rather than source reduction; ex-
isting regulations do not emphasize multi-media management of pollution; and
businesses need information and technical assistance to overcome institutional
barriers to the adoption of source reduction practices.").
150 Id. § 6604(a) (stipulating that the pollution prevention office to be established
in the EPA "shall be independent of the Agency's single-medium program offices
but shall have the authority to review and advise such offices on their activities to
promote a multi-media approach to source reduction").
151 The information allows proper identification and evaluation of program results
such as: measurable goals reflecting overall PPA policy and the tasks necessary to
achieve the goals, dates at which the principal tasks are to be accomplished, re-
quired resources, organizational responsibilities, and means by which progress in
meeting the goals will be measured. Id. § 6604.
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Clearinghouse ("PPIC"), a "free, non-regulatory service of the U.S.
EPA dedicated to reducing or eliminating industrial pollutants
through technology transfer, education, and public awareness."152
The Pollution Prevention, or P2, program also aims to create incen-
tives for partnerships between the EPA and partnership organiza-
tions.1 5 1 While state-level officials and the private sector perform
much of the fundraising and strategy development necessary for pro-
gram implementation, the PPA provides a broad framework support-
ing a holistic approach to pollution source reduction using results
measurement and reports submitted by state level grantees.1 5 4 The
Clearinghouse serves as a readily available source for reduction tech-
nology to any member of the public, providing outreach and education
programs for states to assist with source reduction technology
implementation. 15
The PPA encourages policy innovation and creativity by
preemptively addressing pollution prevention as a whole.1 5 ' By re-
quiring the EPA to establish a comprehensive source reduction pro-
gram, distribute grants for qualifying innovative strategies, utilize
multi-media pollution management, and make reporting and data eas-
ily accessible to the public, the PPA's approach to pollution reduction
exemplifies a holistic approach to reducing pollution at the source.
E. The Best Regulation
The Dodd-Frank Act established the Consumer Protection Bu-
reau within the Federal Reserve to act as a consumer "watchdog."1 57
Led by an independent director appointed by the President, the Bu-
reau has the authority to write rules for consumer protections gov-
erning all financial institutions that offer consumer financial services
and to enforce regulations for banks and credit unions with more than
ten billion dollars in assets.1 5 8 The Bureau oversees the "enforcement
of federal laws intended to ensure the fair, equitable and nondiscrimi-
152 EPA, Pollution Prevention Information Clearinghouse, http://www.epa.gov/
opptintr/ppic/pubs/ppicarchive.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2011).
153 Id.
154 PPA § 6606(a). See generally EPA, 2010-2014 POLLUTION PREVENTION PRO-
GRAM STRATEGIC PLAN (2010) available at http://www.epa.gov/p2/pubs/laws.htm.
155 PPA § 6606.
156 Id. § 6602(b) ("Congress hereby declares it to be the national policy of the
United States that pollution should be prevented or reduced at the source when-
ever feasible.").
157 Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Banking, Brief Summary of the Dodd-
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natory access to credit for individuals and communities.""" In addi-
tion to a systematic regulation and emergency power increase, the Act
created the Office of Financial Research, which is charged with collect-
ing financial data and delivering to Congress annual assessments of
systematic financial risk. 1 6
Public knowledge and awareness are critical for policy deci-
sion-making and enhance rule writing by filling gaps that exist be-
tween a statute's stated goals and its actual implementation.1 61 The
EPA's authorizing statutes regulating petroleum industry actions,
however, are watered down and contain oil industry-friendly exemp-
tions. 1 6 2 These exemptions are found throughout the authorizing stat-
utes, namely the OPA and CWA, which are primarily for cleanup and
response.e1 6  Proposed reform of the TSCA intends to increase public
participation in chemicals regulation and raise the safety standard,
which ideally leads to increased overall public participation.1 64 Au-
thority requiring companies to provide the public access to chemical
information is found in Section 8, but has historically taken advantage
159 Id
160 Id. See also Richard Schmidt, The Treasury's New Research Office, Bus.WK.,
Sept. 2, 2010, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_37/
b4194026970590.htm. The Office of Financial Research will have a director ap-
pointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for six-year terms. Schmidt,
supra. Additionally, the Office will have authority to issue regulations supporting
its own data collection and also will have the power to issue subpoenas to financial
companies to collect information necessary to carry out its mandated functions.
Id.
161 Cf Hogue, supra note 34 (in Naming Names, noting the pivotal role of an in-
formed public in promoting toxic chemicals control reform).
162 See e.g. RCRA § 31: (2) The term "regulated substance" means . any sub-
stance defined in section 101(14) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (but not including any substance regu-
lated as a hazardous waste under subtitle (C), and(B) petroleum." Also see CER-
CLA § 101(14) The term "hazardous substance" means " . . (F) any imminently
hazardous chemical substance or mixture with respect to which the Administrator
has taken action pursuant to section 7 of the Toxic Substances Control Act. The
term does not include petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof." (em-
phasis added).
163 The OPA created a process that enables anyone damaged by an oil spill to
obtain compensation from a "responsible party" as defined by the statute. The
Clean Water Act requires the President, and not the EPA, to issue regulations
establishing procedures, methods, equipment, and other requirements to prevent
and contain discharges of oil to navigable waters or adjoining shorelines from ves-
sels and facilities. Clean Water Act § 311(j)(1)(C).
164 See Hogue, TSCA Reform, supra note 35 (referring to "Safer Chemicals,
Healthy Families," a broad coalition of environmental and public health groups
calling for reform). See generally Hogue, Naming Names, supra note 34.
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of a Confidential Business Information ("CBI") clause to minimize po-
tentially harmful information released to the public."'5
Different kinds of freedoms and individual agency must be
strengthened and protected when developing new responsive policy. 166
On the other hand, the freedom of agency that we have individually is
inescapably qualified and constrained by the social, political, and eco-
nomic opportunities that are available to us.'6 7 Hasty government
regulations may aim to increase overall wealth and freedom in theory,
but when the government tries to provide freedom for one group of
citizens, the end result frequently is a system only capable of taking
freedom from others.
III. CONCLUSION
There is a deep connection between individual agency and so-
cial arrangements. It is important to give simultaneous recognition to
the centrality of individual freedom and to the force of social influences
on the extent and reach of individual freedom.' To counter the
problems we currently face, we must see individual freedom as a social
commitment. Expansion of freedom is "viewed, in this approach, both
as the primary end and as the principal means of development." 16 9 De-
velopment consists of the removal of various types of non-freedoms
that leave people with little choice and little opportunity to exercise
their reasoned agency.
In general, the intrinsic importance of human freedom, as the
preeminent objective of development, must be distinguished from the
instrumental effectiveness of freedoms of particular kinds to promote
freedoms of other kinds. The links between different types of freedoms
are empirical and causal, rather than constitutive and compositional.
For example, there is strong evidence that economic and political free-
doms help to reinforce one another, rather than being hostile to one
another (as they are sometimes taken to be).' 70 Similarly, social op-
portunities of education and health care, which may require public ac-
tion, complement individual opportunities of economic and political
165 Toxic Substances Control Act § 14(c), 15 U.S.C. § 2613(c) (1976).
166 See SEN, supra note 12 (noting the importance of individual agency to a func-
tional democracy).
167 See id. (explaining the notable illustration regarding womens' literacy and




170 Compare SEN, supra note 12 (noting how freedom is both an ends and a means
of development) with Daly supra note 93 (criticizing traditional notions of develop-
ment and economic progres).
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participation and also help to foster our own initiatives in overcoming
our respective deprivations."'7 If the point of departure of the ap-
proach lies in the identification of freedom as the main object of a gov-
erning body, the reach of the policy analysis lies in establishing the
empirical links that make the viewpoint of freedom a coherent and co-
gent guiding perspective.1 7 2
171 See SEN, supra note 12 (discussing the social costs of environmental harm).
172 id.
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